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Trade
and
Morality:
Preserving
"Public Morals" Without Sacrificing
the Global Economy

ABSTRACT

The World Trade Organization (WTO) exists for the
purpose of promoting and facilitatingtrade amongst its member
nations. When those member nations acceded to the WTO's
agreements, however, they acknowledged that sometimes trade
barriers are useful tools in protecting themselves from certain
evils. This Note addresses one of those useful tools-the public
morals exception-which allows a member nation to maintain
trade barriers with respect to certaingoods or services.
Since the WTO agreements have been in effect, the public
morals has lacked two critical things.: a definition and
boundaries. This Note will attempt to define the public morals
exception in a way that preserves the spirit of the WTO
agreements. Furthermore,this Note will propose a test that will
allow future WTO panels to decide whether a country's law or
regulation, justified under the public morals exception, can
legitimately fall within the ambit of the WTO agreements.
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DELIMITING THE "PUBLICMORALS" EXCEPTION

1. INTRODUCTION
Mr. [U.S. Senator] GRAMM: His amendment also deems exempt
those State and local laws and ordinances related to a series of issues1
such as health, safety, environment, or public morals, whatever that is

The WTO's lofty ambition is to "usher[] in a new era of global
economic cooperation, reflecting the widespread desire to operate in a
fairer and more open multilateral trading system for the benefit and
welfare of their peoples. '2 Through the WTO, representatives from
'4
124 countries 3 sought "to resist protectionist pressures of all kinds"
and pledged that they would not adopt trade measures that would
"undermine or adversely affect ''5 the agreements reached during the
Uruguay Round negotiations that lasted from 1986 to 1994. In
pledging so, the leaders of the nations involved in the creation of the
WTO recognized that free trade was an important means of raising
global living standards, "ensuring full employment," promoting the
growth of the volume of real income and effective demand,
"expanding the production of goods and services," preserving the
6
environment, and using the world's resources at optimal levels.
One of the tools the WTO used in promoting this goal is the most
favored nation (MFN) principle. Article I of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (GATT) states that any benefit that a
country confers upon the goods of another country "shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or
destined for the territories of all contracting parties. '7 Similarly,
Article II of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
requires each member to immediately and unconditionally accord to
all contracting parties a treatment that is no less favorable than the
treatment it accords to like services and service suppliers from any
other country.8 Finally, Article IV of the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) places a
similar requirement on contracting members where the article in

1.
148 Cong. Rec. S4604 (daily ed. May 21, 2002) (emphasis added). Senator
Gramm is referring to an amendment proposed by Senator John Kerry to the Andean
Trade Preference Expansion Act.
2.
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS-THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS iv (Cambridge University
Press 2002) [hereinafter WTO Documents].
3.
Current Membership is at 149 countries. See Understandingthe WTO: The
Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tife/org6_e.htm
(last
visited Mar. 29, 2005).
4.
WTO Documents, supra note 2, at iv.
5.
Id.
6.
Id. at 4.
7.
Id. at 424.
8.
Id. at 287.
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question is intellectual property.9
In short, the MFN principle
requires the member nations of the WTO to treat each other equally.
Another trade-promoting device is the principle of national
treatment. In Article III of the GATT, the members agree to enjoin
themselves from using internal taxes and other internal regulations
to favor domestic products and production over imported products.'0
Article 17 of the GATS further requires that nations give domestic
services and service suppliers the same regulatory costs and benefits
that they give to foreign services and service suppliers.'1 Finally,
Article 3 of the TRIPS agreement requires nations to give the same
12
protection to intellectual property of foreign and domestic entities.
Because of this national treatment principle, a nation must extend
the same benefits and burdens to foreign goods, services, and
intellectual property that it extends to the domestic equivalents.
Yet the principles of national treatment and MFN alone do not
govern free trade: schedules of concessions play a critical role in the
WTO. Under the GATT and GATS Agreements, member nations may
choose which goods and services are committed to the principles of
those agreements.
Under GATT Article II(a), in a schedule of
concessions, member nations guarantee that they will negotiate
tariffs for certain goods and bind themselves to charge all member
nations the negotiated rate. 13 This does not mean that tariffs will be
eliminated, and it does not guarantee that an agreement will be
reached for all goods. 14 The services equivalent appears in Article
XVI of the GATS. 15 Essentially, members of the GATS are to create a
list of the services that they will subject to liberalization. 1 6 If a
member nation selects a certain service for trade liberalization, then
the member nation barred from limiting the amount of suppliers of
that service, placing quotas on the total value of service transactions,
limiting output, limiting the supply of labor to the supply of that
specific service, forcing suppliers to sell to particular entities, and
17
limiting foreign shareholding.
Any given good or service may be denied lower tariffs by a simple
failure to negotiate. Even if a category is negotiated, however, a good
or service may fail to enjoy the benefits of a lower tariff if a country

9.
Id. at 323.
10.
Id. at 427.
11.
Id. at 299-300.
12.
Id. at 323.
13.
Id. at 425.
14.
See e.g., Schedule CXLIII-Republic of Latvia-Part I-Schedule of
Concessions and Commitments on Goods, available at http://www.takuzinis.lv/
xhtmll.1/20040917.html (providing an example of one member nation's schedule of
commitments and demonstrating the varying negotiated rates).
15.
WTO Documents, supra note 2, at 298-99.
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
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chooses to invoke one of three exceptions with respect to a specific
good or service. Specifically, this Note addresses a provision that
allows a member nation to discriminate to preserve its "public
morals." The GATT provision, which is substantially similar to the
equivalent GATS provision,1 8 reads, in pertinent part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discriminationbetween countries where the same conditions prevail, or
a disguised restrictionon internationaltrade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contractingparty of measures:
(a)

necessary to protect public morals; ...19

The GATS20 provision adds "or to maintain public order" after the word
"'morals." Along these lines, Article 27(2) of the TRIPS agreement
notes that "[m]embers may exclude from patentability inventions, the
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of
which is necessary to protect ordrepublic...,,21
The WTO has never ascertained the definition of "public
morals." 22 This Note will attempt to give meaning to this term in a
manner that preserves the spirit of the agreements that form the
WTO. Part II of this Note will consider various means that could be
used to determine the meaning of the public morals exception. Part
III will first consider which of the definitions extracted from the
devices discussed in Part II are consistent with the general principles
of the WTO and then the implications of abuse of the public morality
exception. Finally, Part IV will suggest a workable approach to
scrutinizing laws and regulations justified on the grounds that they
are aimed at protecting public morals.

II.

DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE "PUBLIC MORALS" EXCEPTION

A. The Vienna Convention Approach
The meaning of the public morality exception remains unsettled
as of today. 23 Multilateral treaties require creative and nuanced
drafting so that the interests of all negotiating parties may be
24
satisfied.

18.
Id. at
19.
Id. at
20.
Id. at
21.
Id. at
22.
Steve
689, 690 (1998).
23.
Id. at
24.

296.
455.
296.
333.
Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT'L L.
690.

ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 184 (2000).
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna
Convention) was adopted in 1969 to settle disputes arising from
treaties made between states through peaceful means and in
"conformity with the principles of justice and international law. '25
26
Accordingly, the Convention applies to the WTO agreements.
Convention, there are four important
Under the Vienna
considerations in treaty interpretation: 27 (1) interpret the treaty in
good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms
of the treaty in context and in light of its object and purpose; 28 (2)
interpret the treaty in context;29 (3) interpret the treaty in light of
subsequent agreements, practice, and applicable laws; 30 and (4)
interpret the treaty consistent with any special meanings intended by
the signing parties. 3 1 An interpreter may also consider the travaux
prdparatoires(preparatory work)-essentially the treaty's legislative
history-and the context in which the treaty was drafted, to confirm
the meaning that is ascertained using the above methods, or to
further interpret the treaty if the meaning that is ascertained using
32
the above methods would lead to absurd results.

25.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, pmbl., 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
26.
WTO Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, WTIDS2/9, 1617 (May 20, 1996).
Article 31 instructs the interpreter to:
27.
1. Interpret the treaty "in good faith [and] in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty" in their context and in light
of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise,
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a)

any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all
the parties in connexion [sic] with the conclusion of the treaty;

(b)

any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion
[sic] with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.

3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a)

any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;

(b)

any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;

(c)

any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.

4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the
parties so intended.
Vienna Convention, supra note 25, at art. 31.
Id.
28.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id. at art. 32.
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The public morals provision has been considered through the
lens of the Vienna Convention. This analysis has conclusively
demonstrated that the precise meaning of the public morals exception
is at best difficult, but likely impossible to ascertain based on the
methodology of the Vienna Convention. 33 Looking at the Vienna
Convention sources has only yielded two answers: the drafters knew
what the term meant (thus, they said little about what it
encompassed) and they intended for the term to include regulations
34
aimed at regulating alcohol.
B. Decisions in InternationalTrade Law Cases
There is no principle of stare decisis in the WTO. 35
Nevertheless, the cases below provide guidance on how the WTO has
interpreted the provisions. These cases also present the various
policy and definitional choices that future panels may make.
1. The Tuna/Dolphin Cases
The Tuna/Dolphin cases occurred prior to the existence of the
WTO. As such, these cases were decided by GATT panels. 36 Mexico
37
filed the first Tuna/Dolphin Case against the United States in 1990.
The European Economic Community (EEC) and the Netherlands filed
the second Tuna/Dolphin Case against the United States in 1992.38
Both cases concerned measures adopted by the United States to
curtail the incidental taking of dolphins by tuna fishermen.
i.

The Controversy Behind the Tuna/Dolphin Regulations

Moral outrage-a notion that "radical action" must be taken to
"defend life that cannot defend itself'-frequently inspires many

33.
Charnovitz, supranote 22, at 704.
34.
Id. at 702.
35.
Panel Report, United States-Final Dumping Determination on Softwood
Lumber from Canada, 4.293, WT[DS264/R (Apr. 13, 2004). But see Panel Report,
Canada-Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222/R
(Jan. 28, 2002), Annex B-7, at B-56 (citing R. Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto
Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1999); The Myth
About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 845 (1999))

(arguing that the absence of stare decisis in the WTO Appellate Body is a "myth" and
characterizing their decisions as adhering to a "de facto" stare decisis).
36.
See Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin I]; Panel Report, United StatesRestrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29[R (June 16, 1994) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin II].
37.
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36, 1.1.
38.
Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 36, 1.1.
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protectors of the environment. 39 Impassioned appeals are common.
For example, one editorialist noted that
[flew mammals are so agreeable when murdered, imprisoned or taught
how to leap 20 feet, dunk a basketball and snatch the trainer's dead
fish on the way down .... Their brains are bigger than ours,
suggesting the far-out possibility of an intelligence as yet outside the
40
limits of human understanding.

The issue in the Tuna/Dolphin cases, therefore, struck a chord with
some.

41

Even though such a compelling issue was involved, some feared
that the trade measures were inspired by protectionism and not by
legitimate moral outrage about gross wrongdoings. A commentator in
the early 19 9 0s noticed a phenomenon of "strange bedfellows" during
GATT negotiations: "While creating new wealth and opportunities,
free trade destroys jobs in an economy's least competitive sectors and
forces the overall economy to become more efficient. As a result, free
trade will always generate powerful enemies. ''42 This preceded a
statement that is central to the issue of the interpretation of public
morals in the context of the WTO agreements: 'These enemies have
wrapped themselves in a green banner and have stepped forward as
protectors of the environment.' Says one U.S. trade official: 'The
environment could well become the new hidden trade barrier behind
43
which protectionists will all run to hide.'
U.S. business concerns became unusually aligned with the
sentiments of morally outraged environmentalists determined to stop
"the killing of dolphins"44 :
The U.S. tuna fishing industry, for example, helped persuade
Washington to block imports of Mexican-caught tuna, on the grounds
that Mexicans were not as careful as U.S. tuna fishermen to avoid
snaring dolphins in their nets.
As soon as Mexican tuna was

39.
ANDREW J. WEIGERT, SELF, INTERACTION, AND NATURAL ENVIRONMENT:
REFOCUSING OUR EYESIGHT (1997).

40.
Editorial, No More Dolphin Kills: We Need to Reject Death Quotas for These
Playful Creatures, Who Have Been Massacred by the Million in the 20th Century, S.F.
EXAMINER, Oct. 9, 1995, at A16.
41.
See, e.g., Bill Bryant, Global Trade Needn't Come at Expense of
Environment, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 27, 1997 at A15 (describing a
subway advertisement that urged that Congress "not let dolphins be sacrificed on the
altar of free trade"); Stuart Auerbach, Raising a Roar Over a Ruling: Trade Pact
Imperils Environmental Laws, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1991 at D01 (describing the 30mile-long "curtains of death" used by fishermen in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan).
42.
Peter Fuhrman, Strange Bedfellows (New Protectionist Alliance), FORBES,
Dec. 9, 1991, at 94.
43.
Id.
44.
Juanita Darling, Tuna Turnabout: Mexico Announces a Dolphin Protection
Plan, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1991, at 6.
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embargoed in February, U.S. tuna fishermen moved to hike their prices
45
by 10%.

ii.

Factual Background of the Tuna/Dolphin Cases

The disputes brought by Mexico and the EEC (hereinafter, "the
Tuna/Dolphin complainants") against the United States in 1990 and
1992, respectively, dealt with restrictions imposed on the importation
of certain tuna products. 4 6
At the time the Tuna/Dolphin
complainants filed the disputes, commercial fishermen employed the
practice of catching tuna using large "purse seine" nets.4 7 To use this
method a fishing vessel deploys a smaller boat that unfurls a net
around a school of tuna. 48 When the boat has fully encircled the
school of tuna, a mechanism on the larger boat traps the contents of
'49
the net in what is akin to a "purse.
The measures adopted by the United States sought to curtail the
use of this method of fishing in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean
(ETP). 5° The United States targeted that region because experts had
long observed a peculiar association between tuna and dolphin in that
region. 5 1 Indeed, studies indicated that the purse seine method killed
52
legions of dolphins in the ETP since the 1960s.
In response to these startling numbers, the United States passed
the Marine Mammals Protection Act in 1972 (MMPA). 53 Congress
enacted the MMPA when it found that "certain species and
population stocks of marine mammals are, or may be, in danger of
extinction or depletion as a result of man's activities. ''54 In addition
to the ecological reasons for protecting the mammals, 55 Congress
found that it should protect marine mammals because of their great
"esthetic [sic] and recreational" value. 56
The MMPA regulated tuna fishing by U.S. fishermen and by
those operating within the jurisdiction of the United States. 57 Under
the MMPA, fishermen were obligated to employ fishing techniques

45.
Fuhrman, supra note 42, at 94.
46.
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36, 1 1.1; Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 36, 1 1.1.
47.
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36, 1 2.1; Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 36, 1 2.1.
48.
Id.
49.
Id. For a complete and detailed overview of the "purse seine" method of
tuna fishing, please visit http://www.defenders.org/defendersmag/issues/summer02/
tunadolphin.html.
50.
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36, 1 2.2; Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 36, 1 2.2.
51.
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36, 1 2.2.
52.
Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 36, 2.2.
53.
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36, 1 2.3; Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 36, 1 2.5.
54.
16 U.S.C. § 1361(1) (2004).
55.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1361(2)-(3).
56.
16 U.S.C. § 1361(6).
57.
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36, 1 5.1; Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 36,
11 2.6-2.8.
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that would "reduce the taking of dolphin[s] incidental" to the tunafishing activities.5 8 The federal government licensed U.S. vessels
under the condition that the entire fleet could not exceed an
incidental taking of 20,500 dolphins per year in the regulated
region. 59 The U.S. government also "ban[ned] :the importation of
commercial fish or products from fish caught" using techniques that
resulted in incidental killings. 0
Foreign governments could only market their tuna in the United
States upon showing that their "regulatory regime regarding the
taking of marine mammals" was similar to the regime employed by
the U.S. government. 6 1 To make this showing, countries had to
demonstrate that the average rate of taking of marine mammals was
not greater than "1.25 times the average incidental-taking rate of
United States vessels operating in" the regulated region. 62 If the
United States banned a foreign government's tuna because that
government's regulatory regime did not meet the minimum
standards, then all other nations were required to ban tuna
originating from that foreign government in non-compliance or face
an embargo from the United States. 63 If a primary or intermediary
nation remained embargoed for six months, it faced the risk of a U.S.
embargo on all of its fish and wildlife.6 4 Another act, the Dolphin
Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA), regulated the use of
65
the "Dolphin Safe" label on tuna cans.
iii. Relevant Arguments Raised by Parties
In response to Mexico's complaints, the United States
maintained that the MMPA was consistent with its obligations under
the GATT. 66 Most importantly for defining the scope of the public
morals exception, however, was the U.S. argument that "even if these
measures are not consistent with Article III, they were covered by the
exceptions in Article XX(b) and XX(g). ''6 7 Article XX(b) exempts
measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or

58.
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36, 9 5.1; Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 36, 2.6.
59.
Id.
60.
Id. 9 5.2.
This is referred to as the "primary nation embargo."
Tuna/Dolphin II,
supra note 36, 9 2.9.
61.
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36,
5.1; Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 36,
2.10.
62.
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36, 5.1; see also Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note
36, 2.10.
63.
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36, 1 5.3; Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 36,
99 2.12-2.15. This is referred to as the "intermediary nation embargo."
64.
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36,
5.4; Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 36,
2.12.
65.
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36, 5.6.
66.
Id. 9 3.6-3.9.
67.
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36, 3.6(b).
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health"68 ; similarly, Article XX(g) exempts measures "relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production
or consumption." 69 Although the purpose of this Note is to define the
scope of the public morals exception, the arguments in the
Tuna/Dolphin cases are relevant because they present a definition of
the term "necessary"-an important qualifier to the public morals
exception. Additionally, Article XX(b) (as well as Article XX(g)) raises
the question of whether one government can create laws affecting
objects outside of its territorial jurisdiction.
iv. May a Nation Impose Regulations on Objects Outside of its
Territorial Jurisdiction?
The Tuna/Dolphin complainants argued that Article XX confined
its enumerated exceptions to measures that "contracting parties could
adopt or apply from within their own territory." 70 In Tuna/Dolphin I,
Mexico's precise objection was that if the United States could impose
trade restrictions on the resources of another country, then it would
introduce the concept of extraterritoriality into the GATT in violation
of its principles. 7 1 In both Tuna/Dolphin I and II, the United States
disagreed with this argument, stating "a government could prohibit
imports of a product in order to protect the life or health of humans,
plants or animals outside its jurisdiction 72 and that the location of
the object of conservation was irrelevant. 73 The United States noted
that trade measures necessarily have effects outside of a nation's
74
borders, but that the MMPA was not extraterritorial legislation.
A further argument, raised by the United States in
Tuna/Dolphin II, is that the GATT contemplated that countries could
regulate objects located outside of their borders because another
provision implied as much. 75 Specifically, Article XX(e) of GATT
excludes regulations "relating to the products of prison labour.176 The
United States contended as follows: because that subsection explicitly
allowed regulation of objects outside of the country's territorial
jurisdiction, and was adjacent to subsection (b), then it had to follow

68.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194, art. XX(b) [hereinafter GATT].
69.

70.
3.15.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. art. XX(g).

Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36,
Tuna/Dolphin I, supranote 36,
Id. 3.36.
Tuna/Dolphin II, supranote 36,
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36,
Tuna/Dolphin II, supranote 36,
GATT, supra note 68, art. XX(e).

3.31; Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 36,
3.31.
3.16
3.49.
3.16.
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that the entire section permitted the regulation of objects outside of
77
the country's territorial jurisdiction.
v.

The Meaning of "Necessary"

The Tuna/Dolphin cases provide helpful analysis on the meaning
of "necessary." This insight is significant because, similar to Article
XX(a), Article
XX(b) requires that the proposed measure be
"necessary."78 The definition of "necessary" is not a settled issue and
79
has been inconsistently interpreted.
In Tuna/Dolphin I, the United States argued that the MMPA
80
embargo was necessary to protect the life and health of dolphins.
According to the United States, the appropriate test of necessity
required consideration of whether an alternative measure was
available or had been proposed, "that could reasonably be expected to
81
achieve the objective of protecting the lives or health of dolphins.
The United States stated that without the implementation of the
MMPA, purse seining would continue to encircle schools of tuna and
82
dolphin, resulting in the unnecessary death of dolphins.
Mexico responded, in Tuna/Dolphin I, that the MMPA was not
"necessary" because the United States could protect the lives and
83
health of dolphins in a manner that was consistent with the GATT.
Mexico's proposal to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization to
hold an international conference on fisheries and the incidental
taking of marine mammals 8 4 was indicative of its stance: the best
way of protecting the dolphins was through international cooperation
85
with all interested parties.
The analysis in Tuna/Dolphin II was much more technical. The
United States argued that "necessary" had to be interpreted in
accordance with its ordinary meaning.8 6 To be necessary, the United
8 7
States posited, there only had to be a need for the measure.

77.
Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 36, 3.16.
78.
GATT, supra note 68, art. XX (a)-(b).
79.
Compare Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36,
5.28 (stating that the necessity
requirement is met only if the regulating nation has "exhausted all options reasonably
available to it" to pursue its objectives in a manner consistent with the GATT and if the
regulating nation negotiates with other member nations), with Report of the Panel,
United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, (May 26, 1983) GATT
B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 107, 7 58, 60 (finding that "necessary means that the measure
is the only way under existing United States law" that the interest could be protected).
80.
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36, 3.33.
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
83.
Id. T 3.34.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 36, T 3.64.
87.
Id.
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According to the United States, the proposed "least inconsistent" test
was too complex, because it required parties to first prove that no
other measures existed and then to determine, from the range of
available alternatives, which alternatives were "least inconsistent"
with the GATT.8 8 The other problem with the "least inconsistent"
test was that it would implicate sovereignty concerns-other
members of the GATT would evaluate a foreign sovereign's options
and determine which one the prospective regulator could enact.8 9
The EEC responded that the ordinary meaning of "necessary"
was "indispensable," "requisite," "inevitably determined," or
"unavoidable"-to meet this standard there could be no other means
of meeting the objective. 90 According to the EEC it was important to
interpret "necessary" narrowly, because a broad interpretation would
"lead to a bias in the name of public morality," which is "strongly
determined by specific religious and cultural traditions."9 1
In
addition, the EEC argued in favor of a reasonableness requirement,
which examines what a reasonable government would or could do, as
92
opposed to asking what is reasonable for a government to do.
vi.

Conclusions of the Panels

The panel in Tuna/Dolphin I held that the drafters of Article
XX(b) intended for the exception to apply only to the implementation
of "sanitary measures to safeguard life or health of humans, animals,
or plants within the jurisdiction of the importing country. '93 The
panel found that the proposed U.S. reading of "necessity" was
overbroad and would degenerate GATT, providing the benefits of free
trade only to the few contracting parties that had identical domestic
regulations. 94 To meet the necessity requirement, the party claiming
it was entitled to the exception was required to show that it had
attempted to achieve its policy objective through all options
95
reasonably available and consistent with the General Agreement.
Additionally, where the object of the regulation was likely to be found
in or pass through many nations, there was a duty to negotiate with
96
the aim of creating an international cooperative agreement.
The panel in Tuna/Dolphin II reached the same result, but its
analysis differed in at least one fundamental way. Specifically, the
Tuna/Dolphin II panel found that there was no limitation on the

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. 3.65.
Id. 3.71.
Id.
Id. 3.73.
Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 36,

94.

Id.

5.27.

95.
96.

Id.
Id.

5.28.

5.26.
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location of the living things that the regulating nation sought to
protect. 97 Regarding the meaning of "necessary," the panel concluded
that the ordinary meaning of "necessary" requires that no other
alternative exist. 98 The panel determined that the MMPA embargoes
would only succeed if they prompted embargoed nations to change
their policies9 9 and that "measures taken so as to force other
countries to change their policies, and that were effective only if such
10 0
changes occurred, could not be considered 'necessary."'
Thus, the panels in Tuna/Dolphin I and II opted for a broad
definition of necessary.
2. United States-Cross-Border Gambling and Betting Services
i.

The Panel Decision

a.

Motives for the Regulation of Gambling

The regulation of gambling in the United States is not a
phenomenon of modern-day evangelism. Francis Emmett Williams,
the author of a work on lotteries and morals, imagines an angry U.S.
president denouncing a proposed federal law that would considerably
relax gambling laws:
[T]hese same ladies and gentlemen are so absorbed by the skill veneer
and the big prizes behind it that they are blind to the fact that they are
gambling in a game that is saturated from center to circumference with
insincerity, hypocrisy, subterfuge and fraud, and energized by the
10 1
covetous desire to get something for nothing.

Time has left this debate largely to the annals of U.S. history,10 2 but
it remains alive in some sense, 10 3 occasionally with a fervor akin to
Williams' fictitious president.104

97.
Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 36, 5.31.
98.
Id.
5.35.
99.
Id. T$ 5.36-5.37.
100.
Id. $ 5.39.
101.
FRANcIS EMMETT WILLIAMs, LOTTERIES, LAWS AND MORALS 274 (Vantage
Press 1958).
102.
Steve Chapman, Commentary, A Vote for Moral Revival? No Way, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 7, 2004 (commenting that the United States has left decisions about moral
choice to individuals and supporting this by asserting that gambling is now legal in 48
of the 50 states).
103.
Cal Thomas, Editorial, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, May 7, 2003, at 25
(noting that gambling is not a victimless crime and that it is a vice).
104.
Tamara Lush, Vote Could Ease Path of Slots into Tribal Casinos, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at 1B (Florida Governor Jeb Bush comments that
"[tihe true costs [of slot machines at pari-mutuel facilities] are significant and real:
long-term decay of our traditional industries and the social fabric of our
communities.").
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States are the traditional regulators of this morally contentious
area in the United States, with occasional assistance from the federal
government. 10 5
In this vein, Massachusetts enacted a law that
sought to limit the "Use of Telephone for Certain Gaming
Purposes."'10 6 Under the Massachusetts law, anyone who uses a
telephone or facilitates the use of a telephone for the purpose of
placing or accepting bets or wagers upon the result of a "trial or
contest of skill, speed, or endurance of man, beast, bird or machine"
as well as athletic games or lotteries, is subject to a fine of not more
than $2,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year. ' 10 7 This
08
law is subject to certain exceptions.'
Federal law gives the Massachusetts law broader effect. Under
18 U.S.C. § 1804, a person involved in betting or wagering who uses a
wire communication facility for the transmission "in interstate or
foreign commerce" of a bet or wager faces a fine and/or imprisonment
for no more than two years.' 09 Section 1084, however, allows bets
that are placed from a state cr foreign country where betting is legal
to a state or foreign country where betting is legal. 110 Thus, § 1084
forbids electronic bets placed either to or from Massachusetts.
This Massachusetts law is quite common, as evidenced by
similar statutes in several other states, including Colorado, 1ii
Louisiana, 112 Minnesota, 113 New Jersey, 114 New York, 115 South
117
Dakota, 116 and Utah.

105.
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 421 (1993).
106.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 271, § 17A (West 2004).
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2004).
110.
Id. United States v. Cohen provides an example of how a law similar to the
Massachusetts law functions. 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001). In Cohen the defendant, a
victim of the Internet-bubble burst, created a company in Antigua that solicited bets
from the United States. Id. at 70. Customers were to wire at least $300 into an
account in Antigua before they were eligible to place bets. Id. Undercover FBI agents
in New York contacted the defendant several times to open accounts and place bets.
Id. at 71. The defendant was arrested and charged with a violation of § 1084. Id. The
defendant sought to defend himself under the safe-harbor provision of § 1084, claiming
that betting was legal in New York. Id. at 73-75. The court of appeals disagreed,
citing a New York statute. Id. at 75. The defendant also argued that "he did not
transmit information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers to or from a jurisdiction
in which he "knew" betting was illegal." Id. at 76. This argument was also dismissed
by the court. Id.
111.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-10-103 (2004).
112.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:90.3 (West 2004).
113.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.75, subdivisions 2-3 & § 609.755(1) (West 2004).
114.
N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:40-1 (West 2004).
115.
N.Y. CONST. art. I; N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-401 (McKinney 2004).
116.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-25A.1-22-25A-15 (Michie 2004).
117.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1102 (2004).
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Factual Background

On March 13, 2003, Antigua and Barbuda (hereinafter,
"Antigua") went to the WTO requesting consultations with the United
States. 118 Antigua sought to advance three types of gambling: (1)
betting on the outcome of sports; (2) card games involving monetary
stakes; and (3) random number games. 1 19 A small two-island nation
in the Caribbean with a large tourist economy, 120 Antigua attempted
to revitalize its economy in the 1990s with an economic development
plan that included building a large internet-based gaming
industry. 121 Antigua's gambling systems include both internet-based
122
and telephone based services.
c.

Relevant Arguments Raised by the Parties

Although this case includes various important international
trade law-related arguments (e.g., whether the United States
undertook specific market commitments or whether the principle of
national treatment was violated), this Note focuses on the portions of
the Panel report that are helpful to the development of an
understanding of the public morals exception. Consequently, this
portion of the Note focuses on the meanings of "necessary" and
"public morals," as well as the requirement of WTO consistency.
1.

The Meaning of "Necessary"

Antigua advocated the use of the necessity test that the WTO
panels in Korea-Various Measures on Beef and United StatesSection 337 adopted. 123 Under this test, a measure does not meet the
necessity requirement when a "WTO-consistent alternative measure
which the Member concerned could 'reasonably be expected to employ'
is available, or whether a less WTO-inconsistent measure is
'reasonably available." 1 24 Antigua also favored the use of a balancing
approach in which the assessor would: (1) consider the relative
importance of the common interests or values that the law or
regulation to be enforced is intended to protect (the more vital the
interest, the more likely the measure would be necessary); (2)

118.
Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services,
1.1, WT/DS285/R1l (Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter
Gambling and Betting Services].
119.
Id. 3.1.
120.
CIA, The World Factbook, "Antigua and Barbuda," available at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factboodgeos/ac.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2006).
121.
Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 118, 3.2.
122.
Id.
123.
Id. 3.255.
124.

Id.
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consider the extent to which the measure contributes to the
realization of the end pursued (the greater the contribution, the
higher the likelihood of a finding of necessity); and (3) consider the
extent to which the measure restricts international commerce125(the
lower the impact, the higher likelihood of a finding of necessity).
The United States countered that the panel should examine the
word "necessary" in accordance with its ordinary meaning. 126 The
United States observed that "necessary" has a continuum of
meanings12--on one end of the spectrum, necessity may mean
"absolute physical necessity or inevitability" and on the other it may
mean that which is "convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable proper
or conducive to the end sought." 128 When considering the necessity of
a regulation, the United States posited that the WTO panel should
129
consider the "right of Members to regulate.
Antigua responded that the statutes were not necessary because
the crimes mentioned in the U.S. statutes (e.g., loan sharking,
murder, kidnapping, arson, etc.) would not be prevented by
restricting cross-border gambling and betting services. 130 According
to Antigua, the footnote to Article XIV(a) required a narrow reading
131
of the exception.
2.

The Meaning of "Public Morals"

Arguing that the United States has a culture of gambling (with
gambling in forty-eight states, 132 the largest national gambling
market in the world with over $630 billion in wagers, 133 and selfcontained mini-cities of nonstop gambling on the Las Vegas strip134),
Antigua claimed that the U.S. anti-gambling laws could not possibly
be intended to protect public morals and public order. 135 Antigua
noted that there is a wide availability of gambling opportunities in
the United States and that the state and federal governments are
involved in the promotion of gambling. 136 Antigua then attempted to
refute the two reasons the United States claimed for passing the laws
in question by diminishing the credibility of the notion that the laws
were passed to protect against crime and by dismissing the fact that

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

3.271.
3.272.
3.271.
3.272.
3.288.
3.289.
3.8.
3.9.
3.290.
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the United States required a ban on cross-border gambling and
betting, arguing that such a ban would greatly expand gambling
opportunities in school and home settings. 137 This would not be a
problem for adults, Antigua asserted, because the United States
conceded that adults were expected to exercise their own moral
judgment. 138 This could only be a problem, therefore, for the morals
of children. 139 Children, however, could easily be guarded from the
moral dangers of gambling through the use of age verification
systems and international cooperation (specifically, in the case of the
United States, through the sharing of social security number
information). 140
The United States maintained that its law was a necessary
141
measure for the protection of public morals and public order.
Noting that the term "public order" emanates from the civil law
concept of ordre public, the United States based its definition of
"public order" on a statement by Judge Lauterpacht, formerly a judge
on the International Court of Justice, expressing that "public order"
refers to "the fundamental national conceptions of law, decency and
morality";142 whereas "public morals" concerns the "standards of right
and wrong that can be described as 'belonging to, affecting, or
concerning the community or nation.' 14 3 In addition, the United
States pointed to the statement in United States v. Edge
Broadcastingthat gambling is an area that is considered a vice and
has been subject to much regulation, 144 and the United States
further denied Antigua's assertion that gambling is commonplace and
that violations of gambling laws are largely unpunished. 145
The
United States also advanced the argument that remote gambling is
vulnerable to criminal activity 1 46 and that "maintaining a society in
which persons and their property exist free of the destructive
influence of organized crime is both a matter of 'public morals' and
'public order."' 147

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

9 3.290-91.

141.
Id.
3.278.
142.
See id. (citing Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the
Guardianship of Infants (Neth. v. Swed.), 1958 I.C.J. 55, 90 (Nov. 28) (separate opinion
of Judge Lauterpacht)).
143.
Id.
3.278.
144.
Id.
3.18.
145.
Id.
3.20.
146.
Id.
3.279.
147.
Id.
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The Requirement of WTO Consistency

Antigua further submitted that the public morals exception
requires regulations to be consistent with the rest of the WTO
agreements. 148 In effect, Antigua argued that there had to be a
balance between the right of a member to invoke one of the exception
clauses and the duty of that member to respect the treaty rights of
other members. 14 9 If the exceptions were greatly abused, argued
Antigua, then the treaty's "juridical character" would dissolve and it
Evidence of a
would devalue the treaty rights of other members. 150
if
regulation's failure to meet WTO standards is present the measure
is "rigid and unbending."' 15 1
The United States argued that the gambling laws at issue were
52
"tools to secure compliance with other WTO-consistent U.S. laws.'
The United States responded that WTO consistency was presumed
153
because Antigua failed to make out a prima facie case.
d.

Conclusions of the Panel

On November 10, 2004, a WTO Panel ruled that laws like the
one in Massachusetts violated U.S. commitments under GATS. 15 4 To
remedy the violation of the GATS, the WTO Panel urged the United
States to bring the relevant measures "into conformity with its
obligations under the GATS."'1 5 5 According to the Panel, the United
States would be well advised to address its motives for certain
and
multilateral
"[t]hrough
bilateral
legislative
proposals
consultations and negotiations" so that the enacted law is consistent
with the free trade principles of the WTO. 156 The spokesman from
the U.S. Trade Representative's Office reacted with outrage, stating
that U.S. gambling laws were exempt from the GATS and that "there
is no obligation for WTO members to conduct international
consultations before taking action to protect public morals and public
1 57
order and enforce the criminal laws."'

148.
Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 118, 3.257.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
3.258.
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
3.273.
153.
Id.
3.274.
154.
Id.
7.1-7.2.
155.
Id.
7.5.
Id.
6.529.
156.
157.
Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Statement
from USTR Spokesman Richard Mills Regarding the WTO Gambling dispute with
Antigua and Barbuda (Nov. 10, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document
Library/SpokespersonStatements/SectionIndex.html.
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In its analysis of the U.S. laws at issue, the WTO Panel used the
"ordinary meaning" approach to defining "public morals" and "public
order. ' 158 The panel found that those concepts could vary in "time
and space, depending on a range of factors, including prevailing
social, cultural, ethical and religious values. ' 159 The panel also stated
that, when considering these issues, the regulating country has the
right to determine the appropriate level of protection. 160 Using a
dictionary to construct a definition, the Panel concluded that "public
morals" meant "standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by
or on behalf of a community or nation. '161 "Public order" was held to
refer to the "preservation of the fundamental interests of a society, as
reflected in public policy and law," including "standards of law,
security and morality. ' 162 Ultimately, the panel concluded that the
laws in question were designed to protect public morals and maintain
public order after analyzing the legislative history of the federal
163
statutes.
In determining whether a measure is necessary, the WTO panel
applied the three-pronged balancing test favored by Antigua. The
first prong of the test evaluates the importance of the interests or
values that the measure intended to protect. 164 In determining the
importance of the values protected, the panel examined the
legislative history of the Wire and Travel Acts. 165 On those bases, the
panel determined that very important societal interests were at
stake. 166 In the context of this line of analysis, the panel also
considered the fact that the United States does not completely ban
gambling and has a tolerant attitude towards it in some parts of the
country. 167 The second prong evaluates the extent to which the laws
contributed to the realization of the ends pursued. 168 The WTO Panel
quickly treated this prong when the panel observed that, since the
acts prohibit the cross-border gambling and betting, then they must
contribute to addressing those concerns. 169 -The third prong considers
the trade impact of the laws. 170 The panel noted that these laws have
a significant restrictive trade impact. 171 The panel stated that
concerns about money laundering, fraud, health, and underage

158.
159.
160.

Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 118, at
Id. 6.461.
Id.
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gambling motivated the passage of the challenged laws and that
regulations that were used to address these concerns in the context of
non-remote gambling (e.g., traditional brick-and-mortar casinos)
could not be "compared and examined as WTO-consistent
alternatives" that could have been used to address these concerns in
the context of remote gambling. 172 Despite this, the WTO Panel
states that "in rejecting Antigua's invitation to engage in bilateral or
multilateral consultations and/or negotiations, the United States
failed to pursue in good faith a course of action that could have been
used by it to explore the possibility of finding a reasonably available
WTO-consistent alternative. '173
In sum, the United States
174
contravened its obligations under the GATS by failing to negotiate.
ii.

The Appellate Body Decision

On April 7, 2005, a WTO appellate panel weighed in on the
gambling dispute.1 76 First, the Appellate Body determined that the
1 76
U.S. gambling statutes fell within the concept of "public morals."'
Then, the Appellate Body applied what it called an "objective"
standard of necessity. 177 The Appellate Body overturned the Panel's
decision that required the United States to engage in consultations
with Antigua and then employed a balancing test in which it
identified, weighed, and balanced relevant factors. 178 The Appellate
Body determined that Antigua's failure to identify a reasonably
available alternative measure demonstrated that the U.S. statutes
179
were "necessary."'
The Appellate Body, however, did not find that the U.S. laws
were "necessary" because they were indispensable to the protection of
public morals. Instead, the Appellate Body found that the U.S. laws
were necessary because Antigua failed to meet its burden under a
three-part burden-shifting scheme.
Under the Appellate Body's
three-part scheme:
(1)

172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id.
Id.

The defending party must first "make a prima facie case
that its measure is 'necessary' by putting forward evidence
and arguments that enable a panel to assess the challenged
measure in the light of the relevant factors to be 'weighed

6.521.
6.531.
6.535.

175.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures the Cross-BorderSupply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Gambling

and Betting Services Appeal].
176.
Id. 7 299.
177.
Id. 304.
178.
Id. 77 323, 325.
179.
Id. 7 326.
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and balanced' in a given case." The defending party,
however, is under no obligation to point out why alternative
measures are inadequate, but it may do so if it would
180
like.
The complaining party then has the opportunity to offer a
WTO-consistent alternative that, in the complaining party's
181
view, the defending party should have taken.
If the complaining party proposes a WTO-consistent
alternative, then the defending party must show "why its
challenged measure nevertheless remains 'necessary' in the
light of that alternative or, in other words, why the
proposed alternative is not, in fact, 'reasonably available."'
If the defending party can show that the proposed
alternative is not "reasonably available,"'182 then the WTO
183
will deem the challenged measure "necessary."

Applying this scheme, the Appellate Body found that Antigua had
failed to raise WTO-consistent alternatives. 184 Thus, the Appellate
Body found the challenged measure "necessary."
C. The Usage of "PublicMorals"
The term "public morals" (and its variations) has an extensive
history of usage. Courts and legislative bodies have used this term
abundantly in the opinions and statutes. This Section provides a
survey (though, of course, not an exhaustive one) of the usage of these
terms across the world.
1. The United States
A survey of all United States laws reveals that U.S. Code and the
laws of thirty-six states and territories mention the term "public
morals." Several U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting the U.S.
Constitution also refer to "public morals." The U.S. Code address this
187
185
gambling, 186 obscenity,
term with respect to smuggling of aliens,
188
189
drug
use
by
prisoners,
general
drug
use,
alcohol
transportation, 190 and observance of state health laws. 19 1

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. 310.
Id. 311.
Id.
Id.
Id. 326
18 U.S.C. § 1328 (2004).
18 U.S.C. § 1084.
18 U.S.C. § 1461.
18 U.S.C. § 4253.
21 U.S.C. § 802.
26 U.S.C. § 2055.
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State laws tend to mention them in the context of conspiracy, 192
194
brothels, 195 alcohol, 9 6
obscene movies and magazines, 193 drugs,
198
197
breaches of peace, 99
public nuisances,
indecent advertisements,
20 2
20 1
200
immoral shows, 20 3
religion,
gambling,
disorderly conduct,
20 5
20 4
prostitution, 20 6 abortion, 207
sex crimes,
cruelty to animals,
2
0
8
sodomy and bestiality,
weapons sales, 20 9 cruelty, 2 10 battery and
exploitation of the sick, 211 cohabitation, 212 habitual sexual
intercourse, 213 voyeurism 214 and bribery. 215
There are a few
"oddballs" such as prohibitions on unruly dance halls, 2 16 tattooing
minors, 217 placing gold fillings in minors, 2 18 disinterring dead
bodies, 219 purchasing dead bodies 220 and keeping stallions or jacks in
22 1
public.
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress
the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. '222 Thus, in one case
the Supreme Court held that while Congress has the power to
regulate commerce among the states, the states "never surrendered,
the power to protect the public health, the public morals, and the

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

42 U.S.C. § 97 (2005).
ALA. CODE § 13A-4-3 (1975).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-817 (2006).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-105-402 (2006).
Id. § 20-27-401.
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Id. § 20-64-702.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105 (2005).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.01 (West 2005).
Id. § 877.03.
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KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4303 (2003).
FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 3.

203.

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22-121 (2003).

204.
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KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4310 (2005).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:80 (2005).
Id. § 14:82.
Id. § 14:32.9.
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Id. § 14:89.
Id. § 14:91.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-102 (2003).
IND. CODEANN. § 12-10-3-10 (West 2004).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-306 (2005).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:82 (2005).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-61 (2005).

215.
216.

Id. § 97-29-17.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-105-303 (2006).

217.
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ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3721 (2006).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:93.2.2 (2005).
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MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-19 (2005).
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Id. § 97-29-21.
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Id. § 97-29-57.
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
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public safety, by any legislation appropriate to that end. ' 223 While
this case dealt with a challenge to a law relating to the protection of
the health of domestic animals, 224 another case confronted the morals
question more directly. In Champion v. Ames, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a law that regulated the interstate
transportation of lottery tickets. 225 Justice Harlan, writing for the
Court and referring to lottery tickets, stated: "But surely it will not be
said to be a part of anyone's liberty, as recognized by the
[Constitution], that he shall be allowed to introduce into commerce
among the States an element that will be confessedly injurious to the
public morals." 226 Furthermore, Justice Harlan defended the law,
stating, "Congress only supplemented the action of those statesperhaps all of them-which, for the protection of public morals,
prohibit the drawing of lotteries. '227 This reflects the judgment that
the government may regulate gambling to preserve public morals.
The Supreme Court has also considered public morals when
analyzing the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which
forbids states from "impairing the Obligation of Contracts. '228 In one
case the Supreme Court indicated that one of the core functions of
legislatures is to protect public health and public morals and that a
229
legislature could not abdicate this role through contract.
Several First Amendment cases from the Supreme Court
indicate areas where government may legislate to preserve "public
morals." 230 The Supreme Court has been unwilling to recognize a
"public morals" exception for the First Amendment. 231
In 44
Liquormart, the Court listed alcoholic beverages, lottery tickets, and
playing cards as a few of the items that would be proscribed by an
unworkable "public morals" exception to the First Amendment. 232 In
another case, the City of Hialeah attempted to proscribe animal
sacrifices to protect "public morals. '233 Ultimately, the Supreme

223.
Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 625-26 (1898).
224.
Id. at 616.
225.
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 322 (1903).
226.
Id. at 357.
227.
Id.
228.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl.1.
229.
New Orleans Gas-Light Co. v. La. Light & Heat Producing & Mfg. Co., 115
U.S. 650, 668 (1885).
230.
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. U.S. CONST. amend I.
231.
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 589 (2001).
232.
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 514 (1996).
233.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
535 (1993).
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Court struck down the city ordinance because it was drafted to
frustrate the practice of a particular religion. 234 The experience of
First Amendment-related legislation and case law indicates that the
regulation of alcohol, lottery tickets, and animal sacrifice is
frequently justified as an attempt to protect "public morals."
As observable from the above, "public morals," or "public
morality," generally-though not always-arises in cases or laws
dealing with the same themes. As Professor William Prosser noted,
the scope of "public morals" includes "houses of prostitution, illegal
liquor establishments, gambling houses, indecent exhibitions,
bullfights, unlicensed prize fights, or public profanity. 23 5
2. Pakistan
The issue of "public morals" was raised and treated, though not
conclusively, by Acting Chief Judge Muhammad Haleem in the
236
Pakistani decision Qureshi v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
This case arose when the plaintiff claimed that the USSR breached a
contract with him for the supply of jeeps and trucks to the Pakistani
Government. 23 7 The court dealt with the issue of whether the
Pakistani court system had jurisdiction to try a case against a foreign
sovereign.2 38
Judge Haleem supports the British approach to
guarding "public morals" through the judicial system. 23 9
The
principal, and essential difference, is that Judge Haleem modifies the
expression "public morals" to "Islamic moral values. 240
3. Latin America
The concept of "public morals" exists in Latin America as well.
The Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights notes, "[i]n cases of crimes against sexual freedom and privacy
or public morals, the proceedings are public actions but require a
private complaint. ' 241 The Commission does not attempt to define
the phrase, but the mention presents trace evidence that the concept

234.
Id. at 547. This was not an incidental interference with the practice of
Santeria; instead, the ordinance was drawn to interfere specifically with that religion.
235.
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 n.5 (1987) (citing WILLIAM
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 583-85 (4th ed. 1971)).

236.
Qureshi v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 20 I.L.M. 1060, 1085 (Pak.
Sup. Ct. 1981) (Acting C.J. Muhammad Haleem).
237.
Id. at 1060.
238.
Id.
239.
Id. at 1085.
240.
Id. Basing the definition of "public morality" on religion is not an addition
by Judge Haleem. Indeed, one of the statements from which he creates an Islamic
version of public morality notes that the common law has its roots in Christianity.
241.
Lopez v. Guatemala, Case 11.303, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 29/96,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc 7 rev. 48 (1996).
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exists in Latin America. This case involved a Guatemalan labor
activist who was the victim of an assassination attempt by
Guatemalan military forces. 242
Subsequently, the Guatemalan
government denied the victim legal protection. 243 The complaint
alleged a violation of several articles of the American Convention on
24 4
Human Rights.
4. Australia
The Australian view of "public morals" may be coextensive with
the U.S. view of "public morals" as expressed through Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. In King v. Connare, an Australian court heard
the appeal of Connare, who was charged with a violation of the
Lottery and Art Unions Act after he attempted to sell a Tasmanian
lottery ticket in Sydney. 24 5 The appeal dealt with the issue of
whether the Act violated Section 92 of the Constitution because it
constituted a restriction upon the freedom of trade, commerce, and
intercourse among the States.2 46 Ultimately, the court dismissed the
appeal. 247 One judge supported a U.S. Supreme Court opinion which
asked, anticipating an answer in the affirmative, "can the legislature
of a State contract away its power to establish such regulations as are
reasonably necessary from time to time to protect the public morals
against the evils of lotteries?" 248 Thus, gambling in Australia could
be constitutionally regulated on the grounds of preserving "public
morals."
Another Australian case indicates that there is (or that at least
'249
there may be) an offense of "conspiracy to corrupt public morals.
While the case dealt with whether a. defendant could raise a
particular defense, 250 the case nonetheless indicates that an
individual may commit an offense against public morals if he
251
possesses materials relating to pedophilia.
5. Canada
The Canadian Supreme Court has demonstrated that the
government may regulate sexual conduct under the guise of "public
morals." In Regina v. Sharpe, the Court upheld the validity of a law

242.
243.

Id.
Id.

1-19.

244.

Id.

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

King v. Connare (1939) 61 C.L.R. 596, 597 (Austl.).
Id. at 598.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 622 (citing Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488 (1897)).
Gollan v. Nugent (1988) 166 C.L.R. 18, 43 (Austl.).
Id.
Id. at 21.
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that proscribed possession of child pornography. 252 The Court found
that "Parliament made a legitimate policy decision in determining
that the possession of adolescent self-depictions of sexual activity
should be prohibited" because such depictions raise the danger of
creating conditions which are "exploitative and can be used to exploit
other children. '253 In Regina v. Smith, the Ontario Supreme Court
upheld the application of a statute forbidding prostitution. 254 There
the Ontario Supreme Court found that certain freedoms are not
absolute and may be regulated "for purposes of decency, public order
'255
and state security.
Contrary to the view of the court in Qureshi, the Canadian
Supreme Court held in Regina v. Big M Drug Mart that religion was
not a valid basis for regulating on the basis of protecting the "public
morality." 256 In so holding, the Canadian Supreme Court struck
down the Lord's Day Act that prohibited "work and commercial
25 7
activity" on Sundays.
Other Canadian cases indicate that "public morals" motivated
legislation in the areas of vagrancy 2 58 and creation of a common
259
nuisance.
6. Hong Kong
Case law indicates that Hong Kong courts allowed the regulation
of alcohol, violence, sexual content, gambling to protect "public
morals." In one case, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal held that the
Commissioner for Television and Entertainment Licensing could
regulate video games on the basis of their content of violence, sexual
content and gambling elements. 26 0 The limitation placed by the
Court was that Commissioners responsible for the granting of
licenses had to find their reasons for banning a certain video game in
the statute, not in their personal moral values. 26 1 In Tsang Ching
Chiu, the Court noted that the regulation of alcohol was an issue of

252.
Regina v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.R. 45, 231.
253.
Id. It should be noted that in this opinion the Court uses the phrase "public
good" instead of "public morals."
254.
Regina v. Smith, 44 CCC (3d) 385 (Ontario Sup. Ct. 1988).
255.
Id. at 386.
256.
Regina v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.R. 295, 321.
257.
Id. at 301.
258.
See Regina v. Cyr, [1917] 2 W.W.R. 1185 (Alta.) (holding a woman liable to
summary conviction for vagrancy under Criminal Code § 238(a) when her only visible
means of maintaining herself was prostitution).
259.
See Regina v. Taylor, [1852] 8 U.C.Q.B. 257 (upholding a mayor's conviction
under 72nd clause of statute 12 Vic. Ch. 82 for obstructing a town street by putting a
fence across it).

260.
Wong Kam Kuen v. Comm'r for Television and Entm't Licensing, [2003] 3
H.K.L.R.D. 596, 617 (C.A.).
261.
Id.
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social concern and that, consequently, the conduct of patrons in
26 2
establishments benefiting from alcohol licenses could be regulated.
This case also supports the notion that prostitution may be regulated
to safeguard public morals, since the parties do not allege that the
government may not regulate the sale of sexual services to preserve
public morality. 263 In another case, a court punished a man for
possessing pornographic materials. 264 The judge noted that the
purpose of the statute under which the defendant was convicted was
"to prevent the corruption of public morals. 2 65
Though many cases indicate that certain sexual conduct may
corrupt public morals, at least one case indicates that trivial conduct
may trigger prosecution for corruption of public morals. In HKSAR v.
Tsui Ping Wing, a taxicab driver was prosecuted for swearing at a
passenger.26 6 The court stated:
No one could sensibly argue that public morality is not adversely
affected by the use of obscene or blasphemous language directed at or
even in the presence of young children.
Generally speaking,
responsible adults use their best endeavors to shield young children
from such language. A public service vehicle driver who does not
respect this and expresses himself in a way which is not civil and
orderly is damaging the standards of morality set by parents and
267
teachers.

Thus, "public morals" may exceed the realm of sex, slavery drugs,
gambling, and alcohol.
7. United Kingdom
A widely discussed British case involving "public morals" is

Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions.268 In Shaw, the defendant

published a magazine advertising London prostitutes. 269 At the time
of conviction, neither prostitution, fornication, nor adultery was
prohibited in England. 270 Nevertheless, the defendant was convicted

262.
HKSAR v. Tsang Ching Chiu, [20021 3 H.K.L.R.D. 172, 176 (C.F.I.).
263.
Id. at 175. Instead, the defendant argues that this was a private club and,
therefore, did not concern public morality. The Court rejects this because there was no
official membership and no attempt to exclude the general public from the premises.
Id. at 176. See also Leung Kuan-Fu v. the Queen, [1977] H.K.L.R. 175 (C.F.I.) (stating
that a sham club where prostitution occurred was contra bongs [sic] mores).
264.
HKSAR v. Wong Man Tat, [2000] H.K.E.C. 915 (C.F.I.).
265.
Id.
266.
HKSAR v. Tsui Ping Wing, [2000] H.K.E.C. 437 (C.F.I.).
267.
Id.
268.
Shaw v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1961] 2 W.L.R. 897, 937 (H.L.).

269.
Case Note, Criminal Law-In General-Courts Have Power as Custodes
Morum to Punish Conspiracy to do Acts Newly Defined as Corruptive of Public Morals,
75 HARV.L. REV. 1652, 1652 (1962).
270.
Id.
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of "conspiracy to corrupt public morals. ' 271 In doing this, the House
of Lords was asserting the residual power of the courts to "declare
criminal ... any act injurious to public morals.

' 272

In discussing the

issues surrounding this decision, Lord Devlin stated, "Christian
morals remained embedded in the law. '2 73 English case law indicates
27 4
that certain sexual acts can offend the public morality.

III. THE "PUBLIC MORALS" CATCH-ALL DILEMMA
It is apparent, from the above discussion, that "public morals"
has a range of meaning that most frequently encompasses alcohol,
sex, gambling, animal torture and drugs. One version of the public
275
morals exception has frequently been used to prohibit slavery.
Though these are the most consistently implicated themes in public
morals-inspired regulations, they are not the only possible targets of
legislation aimed at preserving public morals. The lack of a formal
definition for the term has fed the imaginations of many scholars and
trade experts who view the public morals exception as a means of
achieving social justice through trade. Thus, a judge on the European
Union Court of First Instance writes: "There is no real jurisprudence
on this interpretation of these public morals, but it is possible to
consider that this provision could incorporate some human rights
considerations."' 276 Judge Rosas further suggests that the "provision
could be interpreted more extensively to give a certain basis for trade
sanctions if there have been clear and systematic violations of
fundamental human rights. ' 27 7 A failure to delimit "public morals"
will inevitably lead to an application of the exception that may
frustrate the entirety of the Uruguay Round Agreements.
Confusion already exists on the environmental front. As one
author notes, "Commentators are divided on whether [GATT Article
XX was] intended to apply to the environment in the broadest sense

271.

Id.

272.
273.

Id.
Lord Devlin, Law, Democracy and Morality, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 636

(1962). In his speech, Lord Devlin frequently referred to homosexuality as one of the
acts which offended "public morals."
274.
See e.g., Webster v. Dominick, 2005 J.C. 65, 66 (H.C.J. 2003) (discussing
"public morals" in the context of "shameless indecency" before four young girls); Wright
v. Comm'rs of Customs and Excise, [1999] 1 Crim. App. 69 (Q.B.) (concerning obscene
videotapes and magazines).
275.
Charnovitz, supra note 22, at 717.
276.
Allan Rosas, Non-Commercial Values and the World Trade System:
Building on Article XX, in ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE WTO: FINDING A NEW
BALANCE 78 (Kim Van der Borght ed., 2003).
277.
Id.
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(including moral and aesthetic concerns). '278
Historically, the
application of Article XX vis-A-vis the environment has been
extremely questionable, with nations attempting to disguise
protectionist measures as environmental measures. 2 79 There has not
been a lack of activity on the regulation of environmental activitiescontroversies have arisen regarding fuel-economy and automobile
taxes, wildlife conservation, leg-hold traps, eco-labeling, and chemical
testing. 280 Removing all doubt that the issue has moral implications,
upset parties have accused the European Union of "cultural genocide"
'281
and the GATT of "sacrificing animals on the altar of free trade.
While there is a history of justifying environmental measures using
public morals, the environmental measures that have previously been
justified have displayed characteristics of cruelty.2 82 Such a practice
bears little similarity to air pollution or even killing dolphins through
fishing.
Scholars have also advocated the use of the "public morals"
exception to improve labor conditions. For instance, Trebilcock and
Howse have contemplated how the "public morals" exception would
work in the area of labor rights, noting that labor sanctions would
have to be consistent with the chapeau of the Agreements. 283 In a
separate article, Howse argued, "good reasons do not exist for
excluding fundamental labor rights from the ambit of the concept of
'public morals.' 284
Other scholars have suggested that the "public morals" exception
could be used to secure women's rights. For instance, one author
indicates that the public morals exception should be "interpreted in

278.
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REGULATION
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE 397 (2d ed. 1999).
279.
Id. at 398.
280.

DAVID VOGEL, BARRIERS OR BENEFITS?

REGULATION IN TRANSATLANTIC

TRADE 38-56 (Brookings Inst. Press 1997).
281.
Id. at 45.
282.
See John M. Raymond & Barbara J. Frischholz, Lawyers Who Established
InternationalLaw in the United States, 1776-1914, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 802, 813 (1982)
(observing that Secretary of State James G. Blaine in 1892 protested that pelagic
sealing was against public morals).
283.
See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 277, at 453. See also Robert Howse,
The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers' Rights, 3 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 131, 142 (1999).

Even if the trade sanctions violated Article XI, possibly Article XX(a), which
permits otherwise GATT-inconsistent measures "necessary to protect public
morals," might be invoked to justify trade sanctions against products that
involve the use of child labor or the denial of workers' basic rights. There is no
GATT or WTO jurisprudence on the interpretation of Article XX(a).
284.
Robert Howse, Back to Court After Shrimp/Turtle? Almost but not Quite
Yet: India's Short Lived Challenge to Labor and Environmental Exceptions in the
European Union's Generalized System of Preferences, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1333,
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light of evolving international law on women's rights and rights
related to gender. '285 This author notes that "[t]he public morals
exception operates as a catch-all for measures that do not squarely fit
under any of the other exceptions in Article XX. '' 28 6 Therefore, the
author suggests that the public morals exception could be used for
virtually anything under the sun, except for things listed under the
other Article XX exceptions. The implication of this reasoning is that
Article XX(a) has no meaning-it means whatever the country
invoking it interprets it to mean.
The problem with this resounding lack of clarity in the meaning
of public morals is that it may contribute to one of the evils that the
Though the size of the
WTO seeks to eliminate-protectionism.
28 7
economic costs of protectionism has recently come into question,
economists emphasize that protectionism has substantial social
costs. 2 8 8 When the risks from protectionism are so high, one cannot
responsibly ignore the potential for abuse because of a definitional
problem. Indeed, an entire field has arisen in philosophy which is
premised on the idea that there are no moral absolutes. 28 9 In trade,
the risk is that while one country may consider the forty-hour
workweek oppressive and immoral, another may consider the thirtyfive hour workweek uncompetitive and inefficient. If, in fact, the
shorter workweek is inefficient, then the country using that
workweek may raise trade barriers with the countries using the
longer workweek, using a broad definition of public morals to justify
the practice.
Even if one assumes away the possibility that a government
enacted a law or regulation with protectionist intent, an unbridled
interpretation of the public morals exception can lead to a "war
between public orders." 290 There is evidence that this is already
occurring. 291 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has already dealt with
one battle in the "war between public orders" when it considered the
The
constitutionality of the Massachusetts Burma law. 292
Massachusetts Burma law generally barred state entities from

285.
Liane M. Jarvis, Note, Women's Rights and the Public Morals Exception of
GATTArticle 20, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 219, 230 (2000).

286.

Id. at 232.

287.
See, e.g., Robert C. Feenstra, How Costly is Protectionism?, 6 J. ECON.
PERSP. 159, 159 (1992) (arguing that U.S. quotas impose a loss on trading partners

that is comparable to the magnitude of rents).
288.
See, e.g., William Thorbecke, Rent-Seeking and the Costs of Protectionism, 7
J. ECON. PERSP. 213, 213 (1993) (stating that rent-seeking, a product of protectionism,

redistributes wealth and income, benefiting special interests and harming consumers).
289.

See, e.g., Felix E. Oppenheim, In Defense of Relativism, 8 W. POL. Q. 441,

441 (1955) (explaining the difference between relativism and absolutism).
290.
Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis & Robert W. Staiger, It's a Question of
Market Access, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 56, 75 (2002).

291.
292.

Id.
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000).
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purchasing goods and services from persons doing business with
Burma. 293 The amicus briefs reveal the rift between the public
orders. For instance, one brief, calling states "laborator[ies] for action
on international human rights" argued that "[i]nternational human
rights law creates an affirmative obligation on nation states to
promote respect for universal human rights, including an end to
forced labor and slave-like practices. '294 Another brief noted that the
Massachusetts Burma law interfered with its power and ability to
29 5
deal with the labor practices in Burma through other means.
In sum, the problem with the current state of the "public morals"
exception is that it lacks a fixed meaning. In the absence of an
ascertained definition, the exception is subject to abuse and may
result in the frustration of the objectives of the WTO.

IV. A TRADE-PROMOTING

AND SOVEREIGNTY-PRESERVING

DEFINITION FOR "PUBLIC

MORALS"

When considering the range of definitional possibilities, four
paths are possible.
Because the exception applies to measures
''necessary to protect public morals," definitions must attach to
"necessary" and "public morals." As shown above, the Vienna
Convention has been very unhelpful in achieving this end. For each
of these terms one can adopt either a restrictive or a permissive
interpretation. The four possibilities are as follows: (1) a permissive
standard of necessity and restrictive standard of public morality; (2) a
restrictive standard of necessity and a restrictive standard of public
morality; (3) a permissive standard of necessity and a permissive
standard of public morality; and (4) a restrictive standard of necessity
and a permissive standard of public morality.
The ideal solution to the definitional crisis is to adopt a
permissive standard of necessity and a restrictive standard of public
morality. To determine whether this standard is met, a WTO panel
should first consider whether the regulation regulates a traditional
issue of public morality. Admittedly, this Note has shown that
"oddballs" have made it onto the list of topics that have been targeted
by public morals-inspired legislation. But free trade is at its optimum
when there is predictability, and there can be no predictability if a
term-particularly one in an exception-is afforded an open-ended
meaning. If the regulation does target a traditional issue of public

293.
Id. at 367.
294.
Brief for Non-Profit Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
at 3, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
295.
Brief for the European Communities and their Member States as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 4, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363 (2000).
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morality, the panel should determine whether the regulation is
reasonably related to the preservation of that public morality.
To ameliorate the concern of protectionism, for the purposes of
this test, the only issues that concern public morality are issues that
concerned public morals when the member nations approved the
GATT in 1947. Thus, a limited public morals exception would only
cover sex, drugs, alcohol, gambling, slavery, and animal torture.
If the regulation is a traditional question of "public morals" then
the reviewing bodies should accord a deferential standard of scrutiny.
The cases litigated before the GATT and WTO panels have
demonstrated that it is exceedingly difficult to determine whether a
measure meets one of the various necessity tests.
Currently this
inquiry might be important because of the absence of a limited
definition, but once "public morals" is defined to include only certain
topics, the danger of abusive measures getting by a permissive
necessity test will be substantially reduced.
The least attractive interpretative possibility is to use permissive
standards of necessity and public morals. Such an interpretation
would justify virtually any policy advanced as being related to
preserving public morals.
A permissive standard of public morality combined with a
restrictive standard of necessity would allow for the regulation of
virtually anything as a question of public morals, but would then
apply a very high standard of scrutiny (i.e., the least restrictive
means test employed in the Tuna/Dolphin cases).
While this
approach would reflect a trade-promoting approach, legitimate public
morals regulations may be blocked by the high standard of scrutiny
alongwith the illegitimate ones.
Another possibility would be to use a restrictive definition of
public morals and a restrictive definition of necessity. This option
would promote trade the most-demonstrating a high degree of risk
aversion to protectionism-but would impinge on a state's traditional
power to regulate certain reprehensible acts.

V. CONCLUSION

The danger of an unclear public morals exception is the danger of
abuse. Without clear direction on the definition of the phrase, there
is a significant possibility that contracting parties could use the
provision to justify protectionist measures. This Note does not pass
judgment on the propriety of measures that restrict trade to coerce
other nations to change their treatment of women, the environment,
and the laborers. The argument is that the public morals exception
should not be used to achieve these worthy goals because its vague
nature can be abused to the point of undermining the WTO
Agreements.
Instead, the contracting parties should consider
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addressing social justice issues through the addition of new
exceptions.
The public morals exception should be limited to the traditional
range of public morals issues, and countries regulating to protect
their public morals should be accorded substantial deference in this
legislative capacity.
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